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Financial developmentWe investigate corporate debtmaturity structure in theMENA region and its firm and institutional determinants
using a sample of 444 listedfirms over the 2003–2011 period, or 3717firm-year observations.Wefind a very lim-
ited use of long-term debt byMENA firms; long-term debt represents only 3.41% of the typicalMENA firm's total
debt, which ismuch less thanwhat is reported in prior literature on other parts of theworld. Consistentwith the
predictions of debt maturity theories and prior empirical findings, we find that leverage, firm size, and asset tan-
gibility are positively associated with the use of more long-term debt while firms facing a higher risk of default
tend to use more short-term debt. In addition, we find that better quality institutions lead to the use of more
long-term debt inMENA. Specifically, stronger rule of law, better regulatory effectiveness, better legal protection
of creditors, andmore developed financial intermediaries are associatedwith greater use of long-termborrowing
by MENA firms. Our findings have important policy implications as they illuminate the path toward needed re-
forms that would enhance MENA firms' access to long-term debt, which may ultimately result in more private
investment and jobs.
© 2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.1. Introduction and motivation
Institutional theory suggests that institutions play an important role in a
market economy to facilitate market interactions by lowering transaction
and information costs (North, 1990). Institutional quality is particularly sig-
nificant for companies operating in emerging markets. In many emerging
markets, institutions, which in North's (1990) words, provide the formal
and informal rules of the game in a market economy, are malfunctioning
or not even in place. Such absence of well-functioning institutions can am-
plify information asymmetry andmagnify transaction costs (Meyer, 2001).
Improvements in the institutional framework are known to lower the costs
of doing business (e.g., Bevan, Estrin, & Meyer, 2004). The insights of insti-
tutional theory were used to examine corporate financing choices across
both developed and emerging countries. The findings suggest that institu-
tional quality plays a pivotal role in explaining cross-country differences
in corporate financing choices and that enhancing the institutional frame-
work would benefit access to finance in emerging markets.
Focusing on debt maturity, Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (1999),
Giannetti (2003), Qian and Strahan (2007), Bae and Goyal (2009), and
Fan, Titman, andTwite (2012)provide empirical evidence that a country's
level of investor protection and the quality of its law enforcement influ-
ence firm debt maturity. Specifically, these studies find that creditorsrespond to poor protection and weak law enforcement by shortening
loan maturities. This evidence is consistent with Diamond's (2004;
p. 1464) theoretical argument that “if enforcement costs are large and
creditor protection is weak, then borrowers rely more heavily on short-
termdebt.”Other studies emphasize the role of other institutional dimen-
sions in corporate debt maturity structure. Consistent with the view that
national culture helps explain cross-country variations in the maturity of
structure of corporate debt, Zheng, El Ghoul, Guedhami, andKwok (2012)
report evidence that firms located in countries with high uncertainty
avoidance, high collectivism, high power distance, and high masculinity
tend to use more short-term debt. Using a cross-country analysis, El
Ghoul, Guedhami, Pittman, and Rizeanu (2014) argue and find evidence
that better auditor quality increases the use of long-term debt by firms.
Belkhir, Ben-Nasr, and Boubaker (2014) further find that corporate debt
maturity is influenced by the extent to which a country's laws and regu-
lations provide protection to the labor force; more labor protection leads
to shorter maturity of corporate borrowings.
Motivated by this growing body of literature pointing to the impor-
tance of a country's institutions to firm-level debt maturity choices, we
examine the role of institutional quality in determining corporate debt
maturity in the Middle East and North Africa region (MENA hereafter).
We attempt to answer three questions: (1) what is the state of firm
debt maturity in the MENA region? (2) Is debt maturity in MENA coun-
tries determined by the same firm-level factors as those identified in
other parts of the world, especially emerging countries? (3) Do
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region's countries? To answer these questions, we use a sample of firms
from ten MENA countries, which are Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait,
Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, and the United Arab
Emirates (UAE). To the best of our knowledge, this is the first compre-
hensive study of corporate debt maturity in the MENA region. As
much as is known, there is no prior research dedicated to the issue of
firm debt maturity in this specific region. Further, cross-country studies
on debt maturity tend to exclude MENA countries from their coverage.
For instance, to examine the determinants of corporate debt maturity,
Zheng et al. (2012) and Fan et al. (2012) use samples of 40 and 39 coun-
tries, respectively, but none of them is from the MENA region. El Ghoul
et al. (2014) use a sample of 42 countries, of which only Egypt is from
the MENA region. We fill this gap in the literature and illuminate an
important dimension of firm financial structure – debt maturity – in a
regionwhere institutional quality represents amajor challenge to firms.
There are several reasons that make the study of corporate debt
maturity in the MENA region an important one. First, as most MENA
countries suffer from high unemployment rates and low private invest-
ment rates, access to financing, especially long-term debt, becomes
critical to any attempt to reverse such situation.1 In particular, private
long-term investments that create jobs require access to long-term
debt. Examining firms' access to long-term borrowing and its determi-
nants can shed light on potential remedies to alleviate the region's
thorny problem of low investment rates and high unemployment. Sec-
ond, while facing a challenging geopolitical environment, most MENA
countries have been striving to modernize their economies and to inte-
grate their capitalmarkets inworldmarkets. Signs of such endeavors in-
clude the recent upgrading of UAE and Qatar's equity markets from
frontier to emerging by index compiler MSCI and the 2014 decision of
Saudi Arabia to open its $550 billion stock market to direct investment
by foreign institutions. Such moves are expected to increase foreign in-
vestors' interest in the region's companies whose financing and invest-
ment decisions ought to converge toward those of firms located inmore
developedmarkets. Investigating debtmaturity structure of the region's
firms thus informs onwhether their financing practices are in stepwith
those observed in advanced economies. Third, 40.2% of MENA firms
identify access to external finance as a major challenge to doing
business.2 At the same time, it is well known that MENA countries are
characterized by weak institutional environments; financial systems
are still lagging behind in terms of size and efficiency and public gover-
nance and investor protection are often deficient. An empirical assess-
ment of the actual influence of the institutional environment on debt
maturity is of utmost importance as it adds to our understanding of
the needed reforms that might improve firms' financing opportunities
and therefore investment and job creation.
We examine corporate debt maturity and its firm and institutional
determinants in MENA in a sample of 444 listed firms over the 2003–
2011 period, or 3717 firm-year observations. Our most striking finding
is that firms' use of long-term debt, measured as debt maturing in
more than 1 year, is very scarce across the MENA region. The typical
firm in MENA, if taken as a whole, has only 3.41% of its total debt as
long-term debt. The use of long-term debt varies from one country to
another. The weakest use of long-term debt is observed in Egypt
where long-term debt of the typical firm represents only 2.45% of total
debt. Oman is the country where the use of long-term debt is the
most prevalent among all our sample countries; long-term debt of the
typical firm represents 8.10% of total debt. By way of comparison, the
use of long-term debt in any MENA country is lower than in any of the
countries reported in prior studies on debt maturity (e.g., El Ghoul1 According to recent IMF and World Bank statistics, unemployment in the MENA re-
gion is the highest in the world – a rate close to 20%, with youth unemployment rate
reaching up to 25%; this rate reaches up to about 30% in Tunisia. The averageMENAprivate
investment rate is about 15% of GDP (IMF 2013 statistics).
2 Data available on www.enterprisesurveys.com, accessed on February 09, 2015.et al., 2014; Fan et al., 2012; Kirch & Terra, 2012; Demirgüç-Kunt &
Maksimovic, 1999). In sum, MENA firms rely much less on long-term
debt compared not only to firms located in developed countries but
also to those located in developing countries reported in prior studies.
Examiningfirm-level determinants of debtmaturity inMENA,wefind
that, consistent with prior studies, leverage, firm size, asset tangibility,
and risk of default are consistently related to the use of long-term debt.
Specifically, larger firms, firms with a greater capacity to borrow – with
more leverage – firms holding more tangible assets, and firms facing a
lower risk of default tend to raise more long-term debt. These findings
hold in a country-by-country analysis aswell as in a cross-country setting
where we pool all firm-year observations together. They imply that the
use of long-term debt in MENA countries responds to the same firm-
level factors identifiedbyprior theoretical and empirical debtmaturity lit-
erature (e.g., Myers, 1977; Barnea, Haugen, & Senbet, 1980; Flannery,
1986; Diamond, 1991; Barclay & Smith, 1995; Stohs & Mauer, 1996;
Johnson, 2003; Custódio, Ferreira, & Laureano, 2013, etc).
Besides firm-level factors, we examine whether the quality of insti-
tutions with direct relevance to firm financing has an influence on the
extent towhich firms inMENA countries use long-term debt. Specifical-
ly, we examine whether the quality of public governance, financial de-
velopment, and creditor rights impact the use of long-term debt. To
capture the quality of public governance, we rely on three different in-
dicators that measure the rule of law (RL), regulatory effectiveness
(RE), and corruption (CORR). We find robust evidence that stronger
rule of law and better regulatory effectiveness are conducive to greater
reliance on long-term debt by MENA firms. Firms operating in MENA
countries with a relatively stronger rule of law and a greater regulatory
effectiveness are seeminglymore able to raisemore long-term debt.We
also find that more corruption leads to the use of longer-term debt ma-
turity structures. Corruption seems to ease firms' access to long-term
debt by helping firm managers in overcoming stringent bank policies
related to long-term lending. As regards financial development, we
find thatfirms operating in the presence ofmore developed financial in-
termediaries use more long-term debt. Stock market development has,
however, no impact on the use of long-term debt. Finally, using
Djankov,McLiesh, and Shleifer's (2007) creditor rights' index, we report
evidence that better legal protection of creditors leads to more long-
term inMENA firms' balance sheets. The results obtained using the ran-
dom effects model are robust to the use of alternative specifications,
such as the simple regression model, firm fixed effects panel model,
2SLS, Tobit estimation, and the IV-GMM method. Similarly, an alterna-
tive measure of debt maturity such as the ratio of long-term liabilities
to total liabilities yields qualitatively similar results.
Our study of corporate debt maturity and its determinants in MENA
contributes to a growing body of literature highlighting the importance
of institutional quality to firms' access to long-term debt. Demirgüç-
Kunt and Maksimovic (1999); Giannetti (2003); Antoniou, Guney, and
Paudyal (2008); Bae and Goyal (2009); Fan et al. (2012), and Zheng
et al. (2012) show that firms operating in better quality institutional en-
vironments tend to use more long-term debt. We add to their findings
by providing evidence, from a region that has not been covered by
prior literature, that in very weak institutional environments, firms'
use of long-term debt can be extremely low. Our study also adds to
a strand of literature that focuses on corporate debt maturity struc-
ture in developing countries. While quite scarce, this literature pro-
vides important insights on the constraints faced by firms from
developing countries in raising external finance. In this regard, our
study intersects with Kirch and Terra's (2012) and Cai, Fairchild,
and Guney's (2008) works on corporate debt maturity structures in
South American countries and in China, respectively. We augment
their findings with evidence, from the MENA region, suggesting
that strengthening the rule of law, providing better legal protection
to creditors, and developing the financial system should ease firms'
constraints to access long-term debt and ultimately enhance invest-
ment and job creation.
3 See, for instance, Transparency International (2013) report available on http://www.
transparency.org/cpi2013. However, it is worth noticing that some countries are
performing better than others when it comes to corruption control, as in 2013, the UAE
and Qatar scored above the median line of the Corruption Perceptions Index.
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theories of the determinants of the firm's debt maturity. The section
also discusses the role of institutional factors. In section 3, we describe
our sample and we provide summary statistics on average debt maturi-
ty of firms across MENA countries. The models used and the analysis of
the influence of institutional variables as well as other variables on debt
maturity are included in section 4. Finally in section 5, we provide some
concluding remarks.
2. Institutions and debt maturity in MENA
2.1. Debt maturity: Prior literature
Since Stiglitz's (1974) proposition on the irrelevance of the choice of
debt maturity structure, much research effort has been directed to bet-
ter understand the determinants of debt maturity. The works of Myers
(1977), Barnea et al. (1980), Brick and Ravid (1985), Flannery (1986),
and Diamond (1991), among others, have provided a solid starting
point for this literature by proposing a number of theories to explain
the firm's debt maturity structure. For instance, Myers (1977) and
Barnea et al. (1980) argue that firms can mitigate the agency conflicts
between shareholders and debtholders by shortening the maturity of
their debt since long-term debt is less effective than short-term debt
in reducing agency costs. Moreover, Myers (1977) and Chang (1989)
point out that firms can alleviate these agency conflicts by matching
the maturity of their liabilities to the expected life of their assets.
Flannery (1986) and Kale and Noe (1990) argue that in the presence
of information asymmetry between firm insiders and outsiders, debt
maturity can be used as a signal of the quality of the firm's investments;
high-quality firms prefer to issue short-term debt whereas low-quality
ones prefer to issue long-term debt. Firm's liquidity risk has also been
shown to be a potential driver of the choice of debt maturity structure
(Diamond, 1991). Furthermore, other studies offer a tax-based rationale
for debtmaturity. In this vein, Kane,Marcus, andMacDonald (1985) and
Brick and Ravid (1985), for instance, demonstrate that the optimal debt
maturity structure depends on the tax benefits of debt financing.
The empirical work that examines the determinants of debt maturi-
ty falls into two main strands. The first strand analyzes the impact of
firm characteristics on debt maturity within individual countries. Most
of the empirical studies on this issue focus on the U.S. market. Barclay
and Smith (1995) find that firms with more growth options use less
long-term debt in their capital structure. This finding is consistent
with Myers's (1977) prediction that firms with higher growth opportu-
nities tend to shorten the maturity of their debt as a way of mitigating
the agency conflicts between debtholders and shareholders. Stohs and
Mauer (1996) find evidence suggesting that debtmaturity can signal in-
formation about firm quality, consistent with Flannery (1986). More-
over, their results corroborate the theoretical predictions linking debt
maturity to taxes, liquidity risk, and asset maturity. More recently, em-
pirical studies emphasize the role of corporate governance in the choice
of debtmaturity. Datta, Iskandar-Datta, andRaman (2005); Jiraporn and
Kitsabunnarat (2007); Harford, Li, and Zhao (2008); and Brockman,
Martin, and Unlu (2010) show that managerial ownership, the strength
of shareholder rights, the strength of the board of directors, and CEO
compensation incentives affect debt maturity choice, respectively. Re-
search on non-US firms remains, however, scarce. For instance, Ozkan
(2000), Shyu and Lee (2009), and García-Teruel and Martínez-Solano
(2010) investigate maturity structure of corporate debt in the UK,
Taiwan, and Spain, respectively.
The second strand of empirical literature focuses on the country-
specific determinants of corporate debt maturity. Demirgüç-Kunt and
Maksimovic (1999) provide evidence that differences in financial and
legal institutions and macroeconomic factors affect the choice of debt
maturity. Using data on unlisted companies from several European
countries, Giannetti (2003) finds important differences across countries
in how debt maturity is determined. Antoniou, Guney, and Paudyal(2006) examine the determinants of debtmaturity structure using sam-
ples of French, German, and British firms. They find that the financial
systems and institutional traditions of these countries are important de-
terminants of debt maturity. Studying South American countries, Kirch
and Terra (2012) show that a country's level of institutional quality
has a first-order effect on the maturity structure of corporate debt.
Zheng et al. (2012) investigate the influence of national culture on the
choice of debtmaturity. Their findings corroborate the view that nation-
al culture is an important determinant of the cross-country variations in
corporate debt maturity. Fan et al. (2012) provide evidence that firms
from countries with weak laws and government corruption have
shorter debt maturities, and those from countries with deposit insur-
ance or explicit bankruptcy codes tend to have longer debt maturities.
These findings imply that the institutional environment importantly
affects the maturity structure of corporate debt.
2.2. MENA region's institutional framework
Prior literature summarized in the previous section documents evi-
dence of the relevance of countries' institutions to firms' debt maturity
structures. In this section, we provide a description of the quality of
the institutional environment in MENA countries, which may help in
predicting and understanding the debtmaturity structure of firms oper-
ating in this region. In this discussion, we approach the region as a
whole and emphasize institutions with implications to firms' access to
long-term debt. We particularly focus on the quality of public gover-
nance, the financial sector, and the state of creditor rights and insolven-
cy regimes.
2.2.1. Public governance
Good public governance fosters investors' confidence that their
claims and property rights are well protected against expropriation by
both the government and private agents. It thereby enhances their in-
vestment incentives. MENA region's business climate has been plagued
by deficient public institutions that failed to act efficiently and in accor-
dance with the rule of law. Recent reports by international organiza-
tions, such as the World Bank and Transparency International, show
that most MENA countries are lagging behind in international rankings
that classify countries according to various dimensions of public gover-
nance, suggesting a great need for substantial actions to boost public
governance in the region. For instance, based on its Corruption Percep-
tions Index, Transparency International consistently ranks MENA coun-
tries below the world median, indicating widespread corruption across
the region and a failure over the years to combat this prevalent
problem.3 Likewise, the World Bank's 2013 Governance Indicators
show evidence of weak rule of law, widespread corruption, and regula-
tory ineffectiveness across the region. The region is characterized by rel-
ativelyweak formal systems of checks and balances. . . There is a relative
lack of accountability institutions that are truly independent, such as su-
preme audit agencies, the cours des comptes, ombudsmen or anticor-
ruption agencies.”4 Weak public governance is likely to have a severe
negative impact on a country's business climate. It, especially, can hin-
der firms' access to credit at favorable conditions.
2.2.2. Financial systems
Despite their praise of efforts made by MENA countries to develop
their financial sectors, reports issued by most international organiza-
tions – IMF, World Bank, OECD, etc. – tend to agree that, on average,
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world. One of the indicators of this underdevelopment of the financial
system is the tendency of MENA countries, especially oil-exporting
countries, to invest their savings through financial sectors based in for-
eign countries – both advanced and emerging ones. In the 2012 Finan-
cial Development Report issued by the World Economic Forum, the
MENA country with the most developed financial system, Kuwait, is
ranked 21st among sixty-two countries classified according to a finan-
cial development index. While such rank can be considered as decent,
it however hides several deficiencies that prevent the existence of a
well-functioning financial system. Such deficiencies are common across
theMENA countries. One of these deficiencies is the quasi-exclusive re-
liance on bank intermediation as a channel of savings to productive sec-
tors; MENA financial systems are heavily bank-based with a minor role
played by equity markets and a quasi-absence of debt capital markets.
For instance, bond issuances totaled only USD83.9 billion in 2012. Of
these issuances, only USD37 billion (44%) were corporate issues while
the rest were sovereign issues. This is trivial compared to other parts
of the world, as in the same year, the worldwide volume of corporate
bond issues amounted to USD3.1 trillion of which USD1 trillion were is-
sued in emerging markets. The Global Financial Stability Report issued
by the IMF in 2004 reveals that bank assets accounted for 85% of finan-
cial assets in the MENA region, which is much higher than in emerging
Asian countries (48%), in emerging Europe (41%), and in Latin America
(35%). A recent report by theWorld Bank (2009) confirms this tenden-
cy; equity market capitalization of non-financial corporations repre-
sents only 12% of GDP whereas the stock of private fixed income
instruments is negligible.5
The banking sector which is the most important source of external
capital for private businesses is, in most countries, plagued by high
levels of government ownership and lack of competition. For instance,
government ownership of the banking sector amounts to 21% in Saudi
Arabia, 34% in Kuwait, 60% in Egypt, and 70% in the UAE.6 Likewise, in
most of these countries, the banking sector is highly concentrated and
barriers to entry of new banks are typically high (Turk-Ariss, 2009;
Anzoategui, Martinez Peria, & Rocha, 2010). High government owner-
ship and concentration are likely to cause inefficiency in credit
allocation and deficient risk management systems.
2.2.3. Creditor rights and insolvency regimes
A country's creditor rights and insolvency regime is an important in-
stitutional framework that determines firms' access to credit. This
framework encompasses the extent to which creditors can repossess
collateral, reorganize the defaulting borrower, and recover the loaned
capital upon default. Theoretical research (e.g., Diamond, 2004) and
empirical evidence (e.g., Bae & Goyal, 2009; Qian & Strahan, 2007) sug-
gest that firms located in countries with stronger creditor rights and
contract enforcement tend to raise more debt capital at better terms.
Djankov et al. (2007) report that creditor rights vary extensively from
one country to another, with consequences for access to credit by pri-
vate companies; a country's ratio of private sector credit to GDP in-
creases with the strength of creditor rights. Araujo, Ferreira, and
Funchal (2012) find that reforming bankruptcy law in Brazil, in a way
that strengthened creditors' rights, resulted in increases of 10% and
23% in the amount of firm total debt and long-term debt, respectively.
In sum, better protection of creditors through a sound insolvency re-
gime enhances their [creditors] incentives' to lend at favorable terms.
InMENA countries, regulations and institutions remainweak and in-
efficient in protecting creditor rights. For instance, insolvency systems
are generally inefficient in settling firm insolvency through reorganiza-
tion or liquidation. According to the Doing Business Report of theWorld
Bank (2014), creditors in MENA countries can expect to recover, on5 World Bank (2009). “Financial Access and Stability: A Road Map for the Middle East
and North Africa.”
6 Financial Development Report (2012) issued by the World Economic Forum.average, only 26.6 cents on a dollar from insolvent firms; a recovery
rate which is lower than in any other region, except Sub-Saharan
Africa.7 Likewise, insolvency resolution is highly costly in MENA coun-
tries as it amounts to 14% of the value of the debtor's estate, compared
with 9% in OECD high-income countries. Moreover, the MENA region
average time to resolve insolvency is the longest compared to all other
regions—3.1 years. While these indicators vary extensively across
MENA countries, they suggest that, overall, firms and creditors in the
region face inefficient insolvency processes that make the recovery of
credit costly and slow.
Collateral is an important trigger for banks' decisions to extent ex-
tend credit in the MENA region; the most recent data of the Enterprise
Survey of the World Bank show that 77.3% of loans require collateral
and that the value of collateral needed for a loan represents 193.4% of
the amount of the loan.8 In spite of the importance of collateral for
access to credit, mostMENA countries suffer from the lack of strong col-
lateral legal regimes. This may be an additional hurdle to MENA firms'
access to credit at favorable terms, as Haselmann and Wachtel's
(2010)findings suggest that well-functioning collateral regimes in-
crease bankers' incentives to lend. In most MENA countries, non-
possessory interests in movable collateral are not recognized by the
lawandpriority rules between secured creditors in case of borrower de-
fault are notwell established. Registration, enforcement, and liquidation
of collateral, especiallymovable collateral, is amajor concern for lenders
and borrowers alike, which, according to Alvarez de la Campa (2011),
reduces the amount of loans secured with movable collateral.2.3. Predictions
Throughout this study, our main measure of firm debt maturity is
the ratio of long-term debt (maturing in more than 1 year) to the sum
of long-term debt and debt in current liabilities. This measure which
we label DMAT has been widely used in the debt maturity literature
(e.g., Demirgüç-Kunt & Maksimovic, 1999; Antoniou et al., 2006; Fan
et al., 2012; El Ghoul et al., 2014; Belkhir et al., 2014). In further analyses,
we check the robustness of our analyses to the use of alternative
measures of debt maturity.
To examine debtmaturity structure in theMENA region, we use two
sets of determinants: (1) firm-level factors and (2) country-level fac-
tors. Inwhat follows,we first identify a set of common firm-level factors
reported inmost debtmaturity studies as having a significant impact on
corporate debt maturity. We discuss their potential influence on debt
maturity based on theories of debt maturity, including signaling and li-
quidity risk, asymmetric information, agency costs, and taxation and re-
port the findings of prior studies. We, then, introduce and discuss
country-level factors that may potentially impact firm debt maturity
in the MENA region.2.3.1. Firm-level factors and debt maturity
2.3.1.1. Leverage.More levered firms face a greater liquidity risk and are
hence expected to borrow with longer terms to maturity to mitigate
such risk (Stohs & Mauer, 1996; Johnson, 2003; Custódio et al., 2013).
Moreover, since more levered firms are more exposed to default risk,
they may prefer to use more long-term debt to reduce such exposure
(Morris, 1992). Examining optimal capital structure in the presence of
taxes and agency and bankruptcy costs, Leland and Toft (1996) show
that the two dimensions of capital structure – amount and maturity –
are the result of a tradeoff between tax advantages, bankruptcy costs,
and agency costs and that firms using more short-term debt also have
a lower optimal leverage. We measure leverage (LEV) by the ratio of7 The recovery rate is 70.6% in OECD high-income countries.
8 Based on datasets available on www.enterprisesurveys.org, accessed on January 05,
2015.
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debt maturity.
2.3.1.2. Firm size. Debt maturity may be affected by firm size for several
reasons, such as financial condition and information asymmetry. Larger
firms are expected to face less information asymmetry and may there-
fore be able to use more long-term debt (Custódio et al., 2013). In the
same vein, Titman and Wessels (1988) suggest that the use of short-
term debt is more prevalent in small firms compared to large ones
due to the high transaction costs that small firmsmay facewhen issuing
long-term debt. Larger firms may also have easier access to long-term
debt due to a better financial condition (e.g., Johnson, 2003). Overall,
empirical studies tend to report a positive association between firm
size and debt maturity (e.g., Barclay & Smith, 1995; Stohs & Mauer,
1996; Guedes & Oplar, 1996; El Ghoul et al., 2014). We measure firm
size (SIZE) by the natural logarithm of total assets and expect it to be
positively associated with debt maturity in the MENA region.
2.3.1.3. Growth opportunities. In Myers' s (1977) model, firms with
growth opportunities can mitigate the underinvestment problem due
to the conflict of interest between stockholders and debt holders
through the use of short-term debt. Consistent with this idea, Barclay
and Smith (1995); Guedes and Oplar (1996); Barclay, Marx, and
Smith (2003); and Johnson (2003), among others, find that debt matu-
rity is negatively associated with growth opportunities. In a sample of
U.S initial public debt offerings, Datta, Iskandar-Datta, and Patel
(2000) report an inverse relation between future growth opportunities
and corporate bond term-to-maturity. We measure growth opportuni-
ties (GROWTH) as the ratio of the market value of equity plus the
book value of debt to book value of assets. We expect GROWTH to be
negatively associated with debt maturity.
2.3.1.4. Asset tangibility. Hart and Moore (1994) argue that when assets
retain value, the investor retains the ability to extract repayment and
can lend longer-term. Analyzing the optimal structure of debt, Berglöf
and Von Thadden (1994) conclude that firms with tangible assets
should be financed with long-term debt. In their paradox of liquidity
theory, Myers and Rajan (1998) argue that asset illiquidity (tangibility)
increases the likelihood that the assets will “be there,” and gives credi-
tors more time to assess their values and risks, which allows firms
with more tangible assets to raise more long-term debt. Kirch and
Terra (2012) and Custódio et al. (2013) report a positive relation be-
tween asset tangibility and the use of long-term debt. We use the
ratio of property, plant, and equipment to total assets (PPE) as a proxy
for asset tangibility and expect it to be positively associated with debt
maturity.
2.3.1.5. Asset maturity. According toMyers (1977), the underinvestment
problemcan bemitigated by scheduling debt repayments to correspond
to the decline in future values of the firm's assets in place: matching the
maturity of the firm's debt to the maturity of its assets. Hart and Moore
(1994) argue that the optimal repayment path of debt is affected both
by the maturity structure of the firm's projects' return streams and by
the durability of the projects' assets. Assets with longer maturity should
thereby lead to the use of more long-term debt and vice versa. The em-
pirical literature finds that asset maturity tends to have a positive influ-
ence on debtmaturity (e.g., Stohs&Mauer, 1996; Guedes &Oplar, 1996;
Barclay et al., 2003; Antoniou et al., 2006; Cai et al., 2008; Custódio et al.,
2013). We measure asset maturity (AMAT) as the weighted average of
the maturities of long-term and current assets and expect that firms
with longer asset maturities use more long-term debt.
2.3.1.6. Default risk. Custódio et al. (2013) argue that firms with a
higher probability of default might be excluded from the long-term
debt market. In their model of optimal debt policy, Kane et al.
(1985) suggest that firms with less volatile asset returns – lessdefault risk – have a longer optimal debt maturity. Sarkar (1999)
models the debt maturity decision in the presence of default risk
and predicts that bond maturity decreases with the issuer's risk of
default. Empirical studies generally report a negative relation be-
tween default risk and the term-to-maturity of corporate debt (e.g.,
Guedes & Oplar, 1996; Custódio et al., 2013). We use Altman's Z-
score as modified by MacKie-Mason (1990) as a measure of default
risk (Z-SCORE). Higher values of Z-SCORE indicate a lower probabil-
ity of default. Z-SCORE is expected to be positively associated with
debt maturity since firms with a lower likelihood of default might
have better access to the market for long-term debt.
2.3.1.7. Firm quality. In the presence of asymmetric information, debt
maturity can be used as a signal of the quality of a firm's investments.
Specifically, Flannery (1986) and Kale and Noe (1990) argue that be-
cause of the greater sensitivity of long-term debt to firm value, long-
term debt can be subject to more mispricing than short-term debt.
Firms with better quality investments are more likely to use more of
the less undervalued short-term debt whereas firms with lower quality
investments are more likely to use more of the overvalued long-term
debt. We use the return on assets (ROA) as a proxy for the quality of a
firm's investment projects and expect it to be negatively associated
with the maturity of debt.
2.3.1.8. Taxation. A firm's debtmaturity may also be affected by its effec-
tive tax rate. For instance, using an option valuationmodel that accounts
for the presence of bankruptcy costs, flotation costs, and tax advantages
to debt, Kane et al. (1985) show that a firm's optimal debt maturity in-
creases with the fall in the tax advantage of debt; at a lower tax advan-
tage, a longer maturity is required to amortize the flotation costs of
issuing debt. Empirical findings regarding the relation between effective
corporate tax rates and debt maturity vary, however, from one study to
another. For instance, Guedes and Oplar (1996) find that debt maturity
is negatively related to corporate tax rates whereas Antoniou et al.
(2006) and Zheng et al. (2012) find no significant relation between
the two variables. To account for the potential impact of effective tax
rates on debt maturity, we include the effective tax rate (ETR) in our
debt maturity models. ETR is calculated as the ratio of income taxes to
pre-tax income.
2.3.2. MENA institutions and debt maturity
To capture the role of institutional quality in determining corporate
debt maturity structure across the MENA region, we rely on several
indicators that capture the quality of public governance, financial devel-
opment, and creditor rights. As regards public governance, we use three
indicators which capture three critical different dimensions of the qual-
ity of public governance: rule of law, regulatory effectiveness, and cor-
ruption. We use two indicators of financial development to investigate
the impact of the financial system on corporate debt maturity. Finally,
we use an indicator of the strength of creditor rights to estimate the
impact of creditors' protection on debt maturity.
2.3.2.1. Rule of law. The rule of law refers to the legal principle that the
behavior of government institutions and officials as well of private enti-
ties is subject to the supremacy of law. To examinewhether abidance by
the rule of law affects firm debtmaturity inMENA countries, we use the
rule of law index developed by theWorld Bank (RL). This index reflects
economic agents' perceptions of the quality of contract enforcement,
property rights, the police, as well as justice. RL ranges from −2.5 to
2.5, with greater values indicating a stronger rule of law. In countries
with weak rule of law, expropriation of investors by managers and
firms is easier. As argued by Diamond (1991, 2004) and Rajan (1992),
this is likely to increase the use of short-term debt as the latter makes
expropriation of creditors by borrowers more difficult. With short ma-
turities, borrowers are subject tomore frequentmonitoring by creditors
314 B. Awartani et al. / International Review of Financial Analysis 46 (2016) 309–325and expropriation risk is limited. We, thus, expect that firms located in
countrieswith relatively stronger rule of law issuemore long-termdebt.2.3.2.2. Regulatory effectiveness. Regulatory effectiveness encompasses a
government's ability to legislate and implement policies and regulations
aimed at improving the business environment and fostering entrepre-
neurship and investment. To assess the potential impact of regulatory
effectiveness on corporate debt maturity in the MENA region, we use
the World Bank's regulatory quality index, which varies from −2.5 to
2.5, with greater values indicating a greater effectiveness in enacting
and implementing legislations that enhance firms' and individuals'
capabilities of doing business. We label this measure RE and expect it
to have a positive impact on firm debt maturity.2.3.2.3. Corruption. When it comes to raising external finance, wide-
spread corruption may increase the cost of long-term loans due to the
costly bribes that firmsmay need to disburse to bankers and/or govern-
ment officials to access such (risky) loans. In such a case, the more cor-
ruption a country has, the lower the long-term debt that firms can raise.
Yet, one can also argue that corruption may help firms in overcoming
stringent bank policies related to long-term lending and therefore
ease firms' access to long-term debt. If this is the case, more corruption
should lead to the use of more long-term debt, all else being equal. We
use the World Bank index of corruption as a proxy for a country's con-
trol of corruption (CORR). The index reflects perceptions of the extent
to which public power is exercised for private gain, including both
petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as “capture” of the state
by elites and private interests. The index ranges from −2.5 to 2.5,
with greater values indicating a stronger control of corruption.Whether
higher levels of corruption lead to the use ofmore or less long-termdebt
by firms is an empirical question.2.3.2.4. Financial development. According to Demirguc-Kunt and
Maksimovic (1998, p. 2108), “the existence of developed and active fi-
nancial markets and a large intermediary sector should make it easier
for firms to raise long-term capital.” Well-developed financial systems
may enhance firms' access to long-term debt especially through in-
creasing the availability of information on borrowers. For instance,
Grossman (1976); Llorente, Michaely, Saar, and Wang (2002); and
Albuquerque, Bauer, and Schneider (2009)suggest that share trade in
equity markets conveys substantial information on firms' prospects.
This available information reduces the risk of lending to listed firms.
Thus, the existence of well-developed equity markets should
foster firms' long-term borrowing capabilities. Further, financial inter-
mediaries can achieve scale economies in collecting information
(e.g., Diamond, 1984) and curtail moral hazard through effective moni-
toring, lowering thereby the cost of long-termdebt. Hence, the presence
of an active financial intermediation sector would increase firms' reli-
ance on long-term debt. To account for the potential impact of financial
development on firm debt maturity structure, our debt maturity model
includes ameasure of financial intermediation development (FIND) and
a measure of stock market development (SMD). FIND is calculated as
the ratio of domestic credit provided by the financial sector to GDP
and captures the extent to which the banking sector and other finance
companies are willing to extend credit to enterprises. As in Giannetti
(2003), we use the ratio of stock market capitalization to GDP as a
proxy for stock market development (SMD); this ratio captures the
size of a country's stock market.99 It is worth noticing that financial development can be measured in several ways and
that the literature provides no clear-cut guidance as towhichmeasures are best. In further
analyses, we use alternative measures of stock market development and financial inter-
mediary development.We discuss results based on these alternativemeasures in the Em-
pirical Evidence section.2.3.2.5. Creditor rights. The extent to which creditors are protected
against borrower expropriation, especially in the event of default, is
considered to be of paramount importance for firms' use of long-term
debt. However, there are two conflicting views on the way creditor
legal protection affects the maturity of corporate borrowings. The first
view holds that stronger creditor protection would induce firms to
issue more long-term debt. With better legal protection, creditors face
less risk of expropriation and are thus more willing to extend credit at
favorable terms, including long-term credit. This, in turn, leads firms
to use more long-term debt. Empirical findings consistent with this
view are reported in Giannetti (2003), Qian and Strahan (2007),
Antoniou et al. (2008), and Fan et al. (2012). The alternative view hy-
pothesizes that stronger creditor protection would reduce firms' reli-
ance on debt, particularly long-term debt. In strong creditor protection
jurisdictions, creditors are generally placed at an advantage over man-
agers and shareholders; upon default, creditors can seize the firm's as-
sets, remove managers, and force liquidation and repayment. Aware of
such threat, self-interested managers can reduce the risk of losing con-
trol by avoiding to raise risky capital such as long-term debt. Empirical
evidence in this direction can be found in Vig (2013) and Cho, El
Ghoul, Guedhami, and Suh (2014). We account for the potential influ-
ence of creditor protection on debt maturity in the MENA region by in-
cluding the creditors' rights index of Djankov et al. (2007) in our
regression equations. The creditors' rights index which we label CR
ranges from 0 (poor creditor rights) to 4 (strong creditor rights).
Whether there is a positive or negative association between CR and
debt maturity is, however, an empirical issue.
Consistent with prior literature on corporate debt maturity
(e.g., Demirgüç-Kunt & Maksimovic, 1999; Fan et al., 2012; Cho et al.,
2014), we also control, in our multivariate analysis, for two macroeco-
nomic factors: GDP growth rate (GDPG) and the inflation rate (INF). Be-
sides the firm and country-level controls, we also include year and
industry fixed effects to reduce the potential effect of omitted variables.3. Data, descriptive statistics, and empirical methods
3.1. Data
The firm-level data used in this study are obtained from the Fitch-
IBCAWorldscope database. Macroeconomic data – GDP growth and in-
flation rates – are collected from the IMF's International Financial Statis-
tics, whereas country-level institutional variables are obtained from
various sources, such as the Financial Structure Database and the Gover-
nance Indicators Database of theWorld Bank, and the Heritage Founda-
tion.We report detailed descriptions and sources of all variables used in
the analysis in Table 1.
Our sample includes listed firms from10MENA countries. The coun-
tries are Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi
Arabia, Tunisia, and the UAE.10 We use annual data over the period
2003–2011. In line with prior research, we exclude all financial firms
whose leverage decisions are determined by different factors. We
require that firms have at least three consecutive years of available
data over the sample period to be included in the sample. Moreover,
we exclude firms with negative book equity. We end up with a final
sample of 444 firms and a total of 3717 firm-year observations that be-
long to eleven different industries as per Campbell's (1996) industry
classification.11 To alleviate the impact of outliers on the analysis, we
winsorize all firm-level variables at the 1st and 99th percentiles.10 The choice of these ten countries is dictated by the availability of data in the
Worldscope database. In fact, in many other countries of the region, there are only a few
or no reported companies in the database, which led to their exclusion from our sample.
11 Campbell (1996) classifies firms into 12 industries. We end up with 11 industries be-
cause we remove companies that belong to the finance industry.
Table 1
Description of variables and sources.
Variable Description Source
Panel A: Variables used in the main analysis
Debt maturity (DMAT) The ratio of long-term debt (maturing more than 1 year) to total debt. Total
debt is the sum of long-term debt and debt in current liabilities.
Fitch-IBCAWorldscope, authors' calculations
Leverage (LEV) The ratio of total debt to total asset Fitch-IBCA Worldscope.
Size (SIZE) The natural log of total assets Fitch-IBCA Worldscope
Growth opportunities (GROWTH) The ratio of the market value of equity plus the book value of debt to total assets Fitch-IBCAWorldscope, authors' calculations
Tangibility (PPE) The ratio of tangible assets (property, plant, and equipment) to total assets Fitch-IBCA Worldscope
Asset Maturity (AMAT) The weighted average of the maturity of long-term assets and current assets.
The maturity of long-term assets is calculated as the fixed asset (property,
plant, and equipment) divided by depreciation expenses. The maturity of
current assets is calculated as current assets divided by cost of goods sold.
Fitch-IBCAWorldscope, authors' calculations
Distance from bankruptcy (Z-SCORE) Altman's Z-score calculated as: by Z-Score = 3.3 (EBIT/total assets) + 1.0
(sales/total assets) + 1.4 (retained earnings/total assets) + 1.2 (working
capital/total assets)
Fitch-IBCAWorldscope, authors' calculations
Profitability (ROA) Return on assets calculated as the ratio of EBIT plus depreciation expenses and
provisions to total equity to total assets
Fitch-IBCA Worldscope
Effective Tax Rate (ETR) The ratio of income taxes to pre-tax income. Fitch-IBCAWorldscope, authors' calculations
GDP growth (GDPG) Growth rate of real of GDP IMF's International Financial Statistics
Inflation (INF) Rate of increase in CPI IMF's International Financial Statistics
Access to financial intermediaries (FIND) The ratio of domestic credit provided by financial sector to GDP World Development Indicators
Stock market development (SMD) The ratio of market capitalization of listed companies to GDP World Development Indicators
Regulatory effectiveness (RE) Index reflects perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate and
implement sound regulations regarding the acquisition of property, licensing of
new businesses, hiring of workers, importing factors of production, exporting
output or capital, contracting with suppliers for needed inputs, payment of
taxes, government licenses and fees, and so forth. The index ranges from −2.5
(weak effectiveness) to 2.5 (strong effectiveness).
Governance indicators database (World Bank)
Rule of law (RL) Index reflects perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and
abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement,
property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and
violence. The index ranges from−2.5 (weak law) to 2.5 (strong law).
Governance indicators database (World Bank)
Corruption (CORR) Index reflects perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for
private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as
“capture” of the state by elites and private interests. The index ranges from
−2.5 (weak control of corruption) to 2.5 (strong control of corruption).
Governance indicators database (World Bank)
Credit right (CR) This index measures the powers of secured lenders in bankruptcy. The index
ranges from 0 (poor creditor rights) and 4 (strong creditor rights).
Djankov et al. (2007)
Panel B: Alternative debt maturity measure used in the robustness tests
Long-term liabilities to total liabilities (DMAT2) Alternative proxy for long-term debt calculated as the ratio of (Total liabilities
minus current liabilities) to total liabilities.
Fitch-IBCA Worldscope
This table provides descriptions of all variables used in the debt maturity analysis.
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Panel A of Table 2 presents descriptive statistics of DMAT by country
whereas Panel B reports DMAT statistics by industry and Panel C reports
descriptive statistics of DMAT for the full sample. Panel A suggests that
there is a wide variation across the MENA region in the extent to which
firms hold long-term debt in their books. The average DMAT ranges
from a minimum of 3.64% (median: 2.78%) in Bahrain to a maximum
of 14.83% in Qatar (median: 6.85%). Looking at the median suggests
that the typical firm in Egypt has only 2.45% of its debt as long-term
debt whereas in Oman, the country with the highest DMAT median,
the typical firm has only 8.10% of its debt as long-term debt. A look at
Panel A also reveals a large within-country variation in the use of
long-term debt in the MENA region, with standard deviations of
DMAT above 10% in all countries, except for Bahrain. Panel B of
Table 2 shows that the typical firm has about 4% of its total debt with
a long-term maturity no matter what industry it operates in. Panel C
of Table 2 shows that the typical MENA firm raises only 3.41% of its
debt with a long-term maturity. By way of comparison, the mean
DMAT in any MENA country is lower than in any of the 42 countries re-
ported in El Ghoul et al. (2014) for the 1994–2003 period and in any of
the 30 countries reported in Demirgüç-Kunt andMaksimovic (1999) for
the 1980–1991 period. Similarly, the DMATmedian in anyMENA coun-
try is lower than in any of the 39 countries reported in Fan et al. (2012)
for the 1991–2006 period. In sum, MENA firms' reliance on long-termdebt is much less important not only than firms located in developed
countries but also compared to those located in developing countries re-
ported in prior studies. Fig. 1 ranks our sample countries by themean of
DMAT and confirms the observation of the scarce use of long-term debt
by MENA firms.
In Panel A of Table 3, we report summary statistics of our firm-level
explanatory variables by country while in Panel B, we report the sum-
mary statistics for the full sample. Among others, Panel A shows that,
on average, the largest and the smallest companies are located in the
UAE and Jordan, respectively. It also shows that the most levered com-
panies are located in Oman and the least are in Bahrain. Overall, the
panel reveals a great deal of variation in firm-level characteristics across
MENA countries. Additionally, Panel B shows high variability of firm
characteristics in the whole region.
Table 4 reports summary statistics of country-level variables used to
capture the institutional and macroeconomic environment. As regards
public governance variables, Panel A shows that Morocco and Egypt
have very low records of abidance by the rule of law as the RL score is
negative in both countries. In the rest of the countries, RL is positive,
yet low relative to the maximum of 2.5. Among all countries, Qatar
and Bahrain score best in terms of rule of law. Again Morocco and
Egypt are the worst in terms of authorities' regulatory effectiveness,
with negative scores of RE. Bahrain and the UAE are the best in this re-
gard. Consistent with their low record in terms of rule of law and regu-
latory effectiveness, Egypt and Morocco are the most corrupt countries
12 We particularly notice here that the correlation coefficient between DMAT and LEV is
moderate (0.566), which indicates that long-term debt is not capturing the presence of
debt in a firm's balance sheet.
Table 2
Summary statistics of debt maturity (%).
No. of firms Observations Mean Stdev Min 25th percentile Median 75th percentile Max
Panel A: Debt maturity, by country
Bahrain 18 162 3.638 4.779 0.000 1.536 2.781 26.065 31.209
Egypt 93 837 9.270 13.447 0.941 1.651 2.454 40.654 94.626
Jordan 79 711 7.229 10.831 0.000 2.258 4.914 29.589 93.077
Kuwait 35 315 11.057 12.677 0.000 1.935 6.258 27.860 57.555
Morocco 37 333 9.747 13.521 0.413 1.258 2.717 29.589 62.155
Oman 62 558 14.499 17.797 0.000 2.734 8.105 28.800 84.478
Qatar 16 144 14.832 17.744 0.207 3.206 6.852 41.642 68.420
Saudi Arabia 55 495 7.675 12.004 0.000 1.595 4.676 23.629 60.717
Tunisia 31 279 10.749 11.437 0.000 1.676 6.974 15.332 41.585
UAE 18 162 9.206 11.458 1.001 3.974 5.536 20.541 51.361
Panel B: Debt maturity by industry
Petroleum/mining 16 144 11.656 14.645 2.245 2.305 4.337 16.737 94.626
Consumer durables 15 135 9.172 13.703 2.413 1.419 4.0255 16.806 75.453
Basic industry 138 1242 10.684 15.951 0.207 1.871 3.852 16.429 75.816
Food 75 648 11.279 14.960 1.561 1.032 3.689 15.102 91.421
Construction 72 648 10.094 13.944 0.000 1.731 3.597 16.044 84.478
Capital good 11 99 9.878 15.755 10.723 4.630 5.207 18.280 25.453
Transportation 19 171 11.116 14.797 2.001 1.982 5.005 18.051 75.669
Utilities 18 162 10.187 13.870 0.000 1.062 4.0778 16.196 85.453
Textile/trade 8 72 8.367 15.118 0.000 0.832 3.939 16.453 63.530
Services 38 342 9.187 15.547 0.000 2.562 3.923 28.648 66.928
Leisure 34 306 9.150 15.952 0.000 2.344 4.623 25.879 69.084
Panel C: Full sample 444 3717 10.07 13.743 0.000 1.508 3.416 25.060 94.626
This table reports descriptive statistics of debtmaturity by country (Panel A), by industry (Panel C), and for the full sample (Panel C) over theperiod 2003–2011. Debtmaturity ismeasured
as the ratio of long-term debt (maturing in more than 1 year) to total debt. Total debt is the sum of long-term debt and debt in current liabilities.
Fig. 1. Mean and median of debt maturity by country.
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corruption. On the opposite side, theUAE andQatar are the least corrupt
countries. With respect to financial development, FIND varies from a
minimum of 18.33% in Saudi Arabia to a maximum of 102.9% in Jordan
while SMD varies from a minimum of 14% in Tunisia to a maximum of
177.5% in Jordan. The extent to which creditors are legally protected
also varies from one country to another, with the CR score ranging be-
tween a minimum of zero (0) in Oman and Tunisia to a maximum of
3 in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. In sum, although generally considered
as a uniform block, MENA countries exhibit a great amount of variation
with respect to the quality of their institutional frameworks,whichmay,
in turn, influence the maturity structures of their firms' debt.
In Table 5, we report Pearson correlation coefficients between firm-
and country-level variables used in the debt maturity analysis. Consis-
tent with prior findings and our predictions, we find that DMAT ispositively and significantly correlated with LEV, SIZE, PPE, and
AMAT.12 Likewise, in line with Flannery's (1986) signaling theory,
ROA used as a proxy for firm quality, and in line with Kane et al.’s
(1985) prediction, ETR used as a proxy for tax rates, are negatively cor-
related with DMAT. The sign of the correlation coefficient estimates on
MB and Z-SCORE are however against theoretical predictions and to
the opposite of our expectations. Among the institutional variables,
DMAT is positively correlated with RE, RL, CR, and negatively correlated
with CORR, consistent with our expectations. It is, however, negatively
correlated with our two financial development measures. We also no-
tice that the estimated correlation coefficients among the firm-level
Table 3
Summary statistics of firm-level explanatory variables.
LEV SIZE GROWTH PPE AMAT Z- SCORE ROA ETR DMAT2
Panel A: Summary statistics (mean values) of firm-level explanatory variables, by country
Bahrain 15.640 4.893 1.177 25.504 6.939 1.548 10.287 1.190 15.608
Egypt 47.125 4.883 1.727 32.350 21.238 1.270 9.685 19.196 20.270
Jordan 32.900 4.446 3.270 34.368 31.629 0.909 3.902 11.503 21.879
Kuwait 42.218 5.589 0.945 18.524 13.870 0.918 6.402 2.070 36.645
Morocco 45.607 5.102 1.915 34.303 11.971 1.687 12.458 26.785 22.892
Oman 52.770 4.471 0.971 41.294 33.839 0.994 5.104 −0.852 36.583
Qatar 33.050 5.612 1.172 37.661 73.192 0.715 7.541 0.394 45.135
Saudi Arabia 31.866 5.526 1.966 44.901 134.550 1.001 8.407 6.697 32.825
Tunisia 38.722 4.674 1.388 28.565 5.198 1.444 8.434 11.800 24.284
UAE 37.575 5.653 1.081 26.797 30.397 0.991 7.578 0.198 30.437
Panel B: Summary statistics of firm-level explanatory variables for the full sample
Mean 40.507 4.914 1.845 34.637 42.774 1.099 7.256 9.628 27.402
Stdev 27.559 0.796 15.955 25.527 62.272 1.122 11.249 1.838 26.214
Min 0.000 2.841 0.004 0.003 0.987 −9.858 −77.18 −39.50 2.119
25th percentile 15.812 5.160 0.520 5.827 2.478 0.599 3.265 2.018 8.335
Median 37.266 4.837 0.899 31.283 15.573 1.104 6.450 7.320 20.590
75th percentile 55.294 6.180 1.459 39.960 7.660 1.373 11.30 9.532 26.662
Max 97.172 7.928 540.972 94.804 233.3 7.135 80.16 60.619 100
This table reports descriptive statistics of firm variables for the period 2003–2011. See Table 1 for detailed definitions of variables.
Table 4
Summary statistics of country-level variables.
RL RE CORR FIND (%) SMD (%) CR GDPG (%) INF (%)
Panel A: Summary statistics (mean values) of country and institutional variables, by country
Bahrain 0.630 0.741 0.330 58.076 97.292 1.000 2.200 2.300
Egypt −0.054 −0.345 −0.570 88.337 62.761 2.000 5.300 9.900
Jordan 0.389 0.284 0.305 102.926 177.485 1.000 6.300 4.900
Kuwait 0.580 0.321 0.601 70.899 119.460 3.000 6.300 4.200
Morocco −0.139 −0.206 −0.271 84.821 63.882 1.000 4.800 1.800
Oman 0.560 0.611 0.367 33.591 36.516 0.000 4.400 3.900
Qatar 0.693 0.394 0.987 53.472 118.811 1.000 15.200 6.400
Saudi Arabia 0.146 0.079 −0.112 18.330 98.465 3.000 4.000 3.500
Tunisia 0.137 0.018 −0.012 66.113 14.038 0.000 4.800 3.600
UAE 0.458 0.621 1.031 61.627 36.196 2.000 4.900 8.400
Panel B: Summary statistics of country and institutional variables for full sample
Mean 0.280 0.167 0.090 67.927 91.667 1.481 5.270 5.466
Stdev 0.280 0.369 0.477 32.460 64.272 1.040 3.720 4.804
Min −0.261 −0.619 −0.715 36.530 8.470 0.000 −5.360 −1.273
25th percentile 0.071 −0.175 −0.357 36.624 43.903 1.000 3.190 2.040
Median 0.295 0.222 0.193 70.160 75.201 1.000 4.690 4.295
75th percentile 0.497 0.505 0.380 89.042 118.360 2.000 7.160 8.500
Max 0.932 0.829 1.681 114.319 299.127 3.000 26.750 18.320
This table reports descriptive statistics of country and institutional explanatory variables for the period 2003–2011. See Table 1 for detailed definitions of each variable.
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the same regression equations are generally low, implying that
multicollinearity is not a concern for our analyses.
3.3. Empirical method
We examine how well several firm and institutional factors explain
corporate debt maturity in the MENA region using the following static
panel data model13:
DMATi;t ¼ α þ βXi;t þ θZt þ γs þ εi;t ð1Þ
where the dependent variable, DMATi ,t is firm i 's debt maturity at time
t, Xi , t is a vector of time-varying firm-specific variables, Zt is a set of13 Wemodel debtmaturity in a static setting given the specific institutional environment
inwhichMENAfirms operate. Given this environment,we assume that adjustment indebt
maturity structure is very slow – if at all – and thatMENA firms remainwith the same debt
maturity structures long because of slow and little changes in the underlying factors.country-level institutional and macroeconomic factors, and γi is
time-invariant unobserved firm-specific effects which capture firm
heterogeneity and are time invariant; γs are industry dummies
to control for characteristics that are specific to an industry
(i.e., market size, concentration, financial frictions, government in-
tervention, and support). Finally, εi , t is the regression composed
error-term, which is time-varying and serially uncorrelated with
mean zero and variance σ2.
We estimate our DMAT regression equations using the random
effects panel data estimation technique. The choice of the random ef-
fects method is appropriate for several reasons. First, by including in-
dividual effects, this method can control firm heterogeneity. Second,
since all relevant determinants of debt maturity are included in the
regression specification, it is assumed that a possible correlation be-
tween unobservable individual effects and the explanatory variables
can be ignored (e.g., Affinito & Tagliaferri, 2010), and thereby over-
come the potential problem of serially correlated error. Third, the
fact that some of our institutional variables are non-time-varying
prohibits us from using fixed effect estimations (Wooldridge, 2002;
Table 5
Pearson correlation coefficients.*

















































































































































































































































































































This table presents correlation coefficients between variables. The sample consists of the 444 publicly traded companies in the 10 MENA countries over the period 2003 to See Table 1 for the definition of variables. Numbers in paren-
theses indicate p- values.
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high number of periods, thereby may introduce incidental parame-
ters' bias in the coefficients. Finally, the selection of a random effects
estimation method is in line with the majority of related studies and
therefore allows for a better comparison between our empirical re-
sults and those of the existing literature.
4. Empirical evidence
To examine the determinants of corporate debt maturity in the
MENA region, we use our sample of 3717 firm-years from 10 countries
over the 2003–2011 period. We start the analysis by documenting the
effect of firm-level factors on debtmaturity in a country-by-country set-
ting (Section 4.1).We, next, pool observations fromall countries togeth-
er and include the set of country-level factors in the regressionmodel to
estimate their impact on debt maturity (Section 4.2).
We estimate our DMAT regression equations using the random
effects panel data model. In Section 4.3, we check the robustness of
our results to the use of alternative estimation methods and measures
of debt maturity.
4.1. Firm-level determinants of debt maturity
Table 6 reports the results of country-by-country regressions of
DMAT on firm-specific variables using the random effects method. All
our regressions include industry dummies and year dummies to ac-
count for the potential effect of industry characteristics and time on
the fraction of long-term debt in a firm's debt capital. We first notice
that most firm-level variables selected based on prior research on debt
maturity in other geographical regions and countries generally load sta-
tistically significantwith the predicted signs inmost of theMENA coun-
tries. The use of long-term debt by firms located in MENA countries
seems to respond to the same firm-level factors as those identified for
firms operating in other countries all over the world.15 Specifically, we
find that long-term debt is used more by more levered firms; the coef-
ficient estimate on leverage (LEV) is positive and significant at least at
the 5% level in each of our sample countries. This finding suggests that
MENA firms with greater capacity to borrow are also more able to
borrow with long-term maturity. It is also consistent with extant U.S.
(e.g., Johnson, 2003; Custódio et al., 2013) and international empirical
evidence (e.g., Giannetti, 2003; Zheng et al., 2012).
Consistent with prior literature (e.g., Barclay & Smith, 1995;
Demirgüç-Kunt & Maksimovic, 1999; Fan et al., 2012), SIZE appears
with a positive and significant coefficient estimate in eight of the ten
MENA countries, suggesting that in most of the region's countries
being a large company offers better chances to access long-term debt
compared to a small company. Assuming that MENA-based firms gain
in information transparency as they grow larger, this finding is consis-
tentwith adverse selectionmodels predicting that firms select debtma-
turity structures that reduce the impact of information asymmetry on
their cost of financing; smaller firms that suffer more from information
asymmetry issue more of the less adverse selection-prone short-term
debt. It is also a reasonable finding in theMENA region as small compa-
nies are perceived by financiers –mainly banks – asmore risky andmay
thereby be screened out of the long-term debt market.
AlthoughGROWTH loads negative inmost of the sample countries, it
is however significant only in two countries: in Egypt at the 10% level
and in Saudi Arabia at the 5% level. In these two countries, firms with
more growth opportunities raise more short-term debt possibly to mit-
igate the underinvestment problem (Myers, 1977). In the other14 Wooldridge (2002) shows that fixed effects models cannot include time-constant fac-
tors as independent variables because there is no way to distinguish the effects of time-
invariant explanatory variables from the time-constant unobservable fixed effects.
15 Notice thatmost of the variables loadwith the same signs acrossmost of the countries,
though significance of some variables varies from one country to another.countries, however, growth opportunities seem to be irrelevant to the
debt maturity decision. One reasonable interpretation of this irrele-
vance is that because debt holders in the MENA region are mostly
banks rather than bondholders, the debt holder–stockholder agency
conflict of high-growth firms is mitigated bymeans other than shorten-
ing the term-to-maturity of debt. Specifically, with better access to in-
formation and closer follow-up of firms' activities, banks can negotiate
and enforce strict covenants that reduce the underinvestment risk.
This may, in turn, reduce the need for short-term debt as a tool used
to mitigate the underinvestment risk of high-growth firms.
Consistent with the theoretical view that firms with more tangible
assets can raise more long-term debt (e.g., Hart & Moore, 1994; Myers
& Rajan, 1998), we find a positive and significant association between
PPE – ourmeasure of asset tangibility – and DMAT in seven of our sam-
ple countries. Qian and Strahan (2007), Kirch and Terra (2012), and Fan
et al. (2012) report similar results on the association between asset tan-
gibility and debtmaturity. Our finding also confirms the fact – discussed
earlier – that access to credit in MENA countries is contingent on the
availability of collateral. Specifically, we find that access to long-term
debt improves with the availability of tangible assets. This is a reason-
able finding in the MENA context where legal frameworks of secured
transactions allow for only a limited range of assets that can be used
as collateral.
While positive in nine of ten countries, the coefficient estimate on
AMAT is significant at the 5% level only in Bahrain, Morocco, and
Qatar, implying that in these three countries, firmsmatch thematurities
of their borrowings with the durations of their assets. In step with prior
literature (e.g., Guedes & Oplar, 1996; Custódio et al., 2013), we report a
positive and significant association between ourmeasure of default risk
- Z-SCORE – and debt maturity in seven out of the ten sample countries,
indicating that the lower the default risk a firm faces (higher Z-SCORE)
the greater is its long-term borrowing capacity, ceteris paribus. This is a
much expected result in the MENA region where most countries suffer
from deficient bankruptcy regimes that cause substantial losses on
lenders in case of borrower default. In such a context, it is reasonable
that banks look closely at firms' default risks before deciding to extend
long-term credit.
Consistent with the signaling hypothesis of debt maturity, we find
that firms with greater ROA – a proxy for the quality of projects – in
Saudi Arabia and Qatar issue more short-term debt, possibly to signal
good quality projects. However, the ROA-DMAT relation is not signifi-
cant in the other eight countries. This is not a surprising finding in the
MENA region since, as emphasized in our discussion of the region's fi-
nancial systems, public corporate debt markets play only a very limited
role whereas banks represent the main source of finance for firms.
Accordingly, firms may not need debt maturity to signal their quality
as they deal more with banks which, contrary to public markets, have
better access to private information. Our proxy for tax rates, ETR, loads
positive and significant at least at the 5% level in six of our sample coun-
tries. It is, however, insignificant in Kuwait, Morocco, Qatar, and the
UAE. While the result in Morocco is surprising, it is nevertheless much
expected in the richest Gulf countries – Qatar, Kuwait, and the UAE –
known for their loose tax systems. Overall, most firm-level variables
seem to affect debt maturity in similar ways across many of the MENA
countries. While this may seem odd given that economic structures
vary across countries, especially between GCC-oil-exporting countries
and the others – Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, and Tunisia, this finding may
however reflect similarities in institutional frameworks, which lead to
similar responses from firms and banks when it comes to debt maturity
structures. We now turn to the impact of institutional quality on corpo-
rate debt maturity.
4.2. Country-level determinants of debt maturity
In this section, we estimate the influence of institutional quality on
firm debt maturity in the MENA region. To this end, we pool all
Table 6
Firm-specific determinants of debt maturity, by country.
Variable Country
Bahrain Egypt Jordan Kuwait Morocco Oman Qatar Saudi Arabia Tunisia UAE
LEV 0.244⁎⁎⁎ 0.395⁎⁎⁎ 0.142⁎⁎⁎ 0.129⁎⁎ 0.408⁎⁎⁎ 0.389⁎⁎⁎ 0.451⁎⁎⁎ 0.292⁎⁎⁎ 0.407⁎⁎⁎ 0.273⁎⁎⁎
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.021) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
SIZE 0.842⁎ 0.166⁎⁎ 0.927⁎⁎⁎ 0.328⁎ 0.079 0.261⁎⁎ 0.854⁎⁎ 0.354⁎⁎⁎ 0.969⁎ −0.220
(0.067) (0.035) (0.000) (0.055) (0.563) (0.049) (0.044) (0.000) (0.078) (0.820)
GROWTH −0.896 −0.093⁎ −0.009 −0.107 0.082 −0.246 −0.760 −0.279⁎⁎ −0.382 0.106
(0.210) (0.096) (0.415) (0.332) (0.562) (0.760) (0.474) (0.014) (0.410) (0.119)
PPE 0.047 0.052 0.076⁎⁎⁎ 0.179⁎⁎⁎ 0.217⁎⁎⁎ 0.286⁎⁎⁎ 0.164⁎⁎ 0.052⁎⁎ 0.175⁎⁎ 0.006
(0.283) (0.132) (0.001) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.050) (0.012) (0.014) (0.148)
AMAT 0.181⁎⁎ 0.000 0.001 0.013 0.118⁎⁎ −0.003 0.009⁎⁎ 0.000 0.087 6.504
(0.017) (0.901) (0.791) (0.507) (0.020) (0.213) (0.023) (0.849) (0.478) (0.010)
Z-SCORE 0.320⁎⁎ 0.225⁎⁎ 0.077 0.793⁎⁎ 0.629⁎⁎ 0.426⁎ 0.504⁎⁎ 0.086 0.667⁎⁎ −0.255
(0.035) (0.010) (0.143) (0.042) (0.041) (0.067) (0.042) (0.116) (0.016) (0.116)
ROA 0.018 0.156 −0.004 −0.076 −0.066 0.019 −0.287⁎⁎⁎ −0.095⁎ 0.036 −0.329
(0.855) (0.141) (0.941) (0.442) (0.641) (0.847) (0.004) (0.062) (0.827) (0.597)
ETR 0.842⁎⁎ 0.390⁎⁎⁎ 0.620⁎⁎⁎ 6.814 0.064 0.310⁎⁎⁎ −0.345 0.652⁎⁎ 0.007⁎⁎ −0.891
(0.012) (0.004) (0.006) (0.164) (0.961) (0.000) (0.322) (0.046) (0.040) (0.135)
Intercept −0.348 −0.645⁎⁎ −0.947⁎⁎ −0.710⁎⁎ −0.422 −0.329 −0.344 −0.506⁎⁎⁎ −0.679 −0.177
(0.690) (0.021) (0.040) (0.043) (0.150) (0.151) (0.322) (0.000) (0.498) (0.161)
Adjusted R2 0.572 0.494 0.265 0.401 0.497 0.647 0.607 0.585 0.538 0.300
Wald test 66.83⁎⁎⁎ 315.43⁎⁎⁎ 116.99⁎⁎⁎ 47.59⁎⁎⁎ 105.96⁎⁎⁎ 583.99⁎⁎⁎ 768.95⁎⁎⁎ 460.60⁎⁎⁎ 266.28⁎⁎⁎ 29.15⁎⁎⁎
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Industry effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 162 837 711 315 333 558 144 495 279 162
Firms 18 93 79 35 37 62 16 55 31 18
This table presents regression results of firm-specific determinants of debt maturity by country. See Table 1 for variables' definitions. The regressions are estimated using the random
effects panel method. Numbers in parentheses indicate p- values.
⁎ Significance at 10% level.
⁎⁎ Significance at the 5% level.
⁎⁎⁎ Significance at the 1% level.
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with country-level institutional measures. Results are reported in
Table 7. In model (1), we estimate the DMAT model including only the
firm-level variables. Results reinforce our findings in the country-by-
country analysis, reported in Table 6; LEV, SIZE, PPE, Z-SCORE, and ETR
load positive and significant at least at the 5% level, suggesting that
MENA firms use more long-term debt as they become more indebted,
grow larger, possess more tangible assets, face lower default risk, and
are subject to higher tax rates.Wealsonotice that these results are consis-
tent across the sevenmodels reported in Table 7, implying that nomatter
what additional country-level variableswe add to theDMATmodel, these
firm-level factors continue to positively impact debt maturity.16
In model (2), in addition to the firm-level variables, we include two
macroeconomic variables – GDP growth rate (GDPG) and inflation rate
(INF) – to control for the potential impact of macroeconomic factors on
firm debt maturity. We find that only GDPG loads positive and signifi-
cant at the 10% level, suggesting that firm debt maturity is longer in
countries with higher economic growth. In model (3), we further in-
clude our two measures of financial sector development: FIND and
SMD. Only FIND, which is a proxy for the availability of credit through
financial intermediaries, is positively and significantly associated with
DMAT at the 1% level, implying that firms operating in countries with
more developed financial intermediaries use more long-term debt.17
As much as economic magnitude is concerned, the coefficient on16 We also check the robustness of our analyses to the exclusion of firm-observations with
zero long-termdebt. To this end, we re-run the samemodel specifications as in Table 7 using
a sample that excludesfirm-observationswith no long-termdebt. Thismodified sample con-
tains 397 firms with 3573 observations and accounts for about 90% of our original sample.
The (unreported) results are qualitatively similar to those discussed in the paper.
17 We also use two alternative proxies for stock market development, which are the
turnover ratio measured as the total value of traded shares during the year over the aver-
age market capitalization of the same year and the stocks traded-to-GDP calculated as the
value of traded stocks to GDP in a giver year. With these measure, SMD continues to load
insignificant.FIND estimated in model (3) indicates that a 1% increase in FIND
increases firm long-term debt by 3.6%, which is important given the
sample's mean DMAT of 9.70% reported in Table 2.18 The FIND-DMAT
positive association which holds across the remaining models reported
in Table 7 suggests that firms' access to long term funding depends upon
development of the financial system, especially financial intermediaries.19
MENA countries would, hence, gain in terms of their firms' access to long-
term debt, which is a more stable source of capital, by enacting and
implementing reforms aimed at fostering their financial sectors.
Columns (4), (5), and (6) include separately our three measures of
the quality of public governance in MENA countries to avoid
multicollinearity. In column (4), RL, which is a proxy for a country's
strength of the rule of law loads positive, but statistically insignificant.
In column (5), we estimate a positive and significant association be-
tween RE, a measure of regulatory effectiveness, and DMAT; the coeffi-
cient estimate on RE is positive and significant at the 5% level. This
finding indicates that the better the quality of a country's public gover-
nance, especially with respect to effectiveness in legislating and
implementing laws and regulations that enhance the business environ-
ment, the more long-term debt firms can get. In column (6), we include
CORR to test for the potential effect of corruption on firm debt maturity.
The result suggests that the less corrupt a country is (higher CORR) and
the more short-term debt is used by its firms, possibly reflecting firms'
difficult access to long-term debt by means other than corruption in
low-quality institutional environments such as those prevailing in
most MENA countries.18 Our results are qualitatively the same using an alternative proxy for financial interme-
diation, which is the ratio of private credit to GDP.
19 In an unreported result for the sake of space, we find that FIND continues to load pos-
itive and significant at the 1% level when we estimate the DMAT model excluding SMD.
Moreover, the fact that the positive and significant association between FIND and DMAT
holds across columns (4) – (7) suggests that the FIND-DMAT association documented in
column (3) is not due to potential collinearity between FIND and SMD.
Table 7
Firm- and country- level determinates of debt maturity.
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
LEV 0.353⁎⁎⁎ 0.353⁎⁎⁎ 0.356⁎⁎⁎ 0.356⁎⁎⁎ 0.356⁎⁎⁎ 0.358⁎⁎⁎ 0.354⁎⁎⁎
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
SIZE 0.870⁎⁎ 0.944⁎⁎ 0.822⁎⁎ 0.825⁎⁎ 0.899⁎⁎ 0.756⁎⁎ 0.711⁎⁎
(0.047) (0.048) (0.032) (0.047) (0.033) (0.044) (0.047)
GROWTH −0.020 −0.019 −0.018 −0.017 −0.018 −0.018 −0.018
(0.146) (0.165) (0.189) (0.194) (0.185) (0.198) (0.193)
PPE 0.125⁎⁎⁎ 0.124⁎⁎⁎ 0.121⁎⁎⁎ 0.120⁎⁎⁎ 0.120⁎⁎⁎ 0.123⁎⁎⁎ 0.120⁎⁎⁎
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
AMAT 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.0000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.973) (0.954) (0.968) (0.969) (0.974) (0.965) (0.988)
Z-SCORE 0.677⁎⁎ 0.642⁎⁎ 0.604⁎⁎ 0.647⁎⁎ 0.644⁎⁎ 0.617⁎⁎ 0.707⁎⁎
(0.012) (0.014) (0.016) (0.013) (0.014) (0.016) (0.011)
ROA 0.017 0.015 0.012 0.017 0.017 0.020 0.016
(0.635) (0.678) (0.736) (0.632) (0.630) (0.569) (0.665)
ETR 0.576⁎⁎⁎ 0.568⁎⁎⁎ 0.570⁎⁎⁎ 0.568⁎⁎⁎ 0.568⁎⁎⁎ 0.561⁎⁎⁎ 0.569⁎⁎⁎
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
GDPG 0.209⁎ 0.304 0.172 0.551 2.080 0.898
(0.072) (0.868) (0.977) (0.928) (0.733) (0.882)
INF −0.633 −0.712⁎ −0.699 −0.672 −0.478 −0.684
(0.131) (0.096) (0.102) (0.116) (0.267) (0.110)
FIND 0.036⁎⁎⁎ 0.034⁎⁎⁎ 0.025⁎⁎ 0.029⁎⁎⁎ 0.038⁎⁎⁎











Intercept −0.136⁎⁎⁎ −0.137⁎⁎⁎ −0.105⁎⁎⁎ −0.116⁎⁎⁎ −0.124⁎⁎⁎ −0.114⁎⁎⁎ −0.110⁎⁎⁎
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Adjusted R2 0.510 0.520 0.521 0.524 0.523 0.535 0.533
Wald test 1415.72⁎⁎⁎ 1419.49⁎⁎⁎ 1445.14⁎⁎⁎ 1454.49⁎⁎⁎ 1456.75⁎⁎⁎ 1470.47⁎⁎⁎ 1451.36⁎⁎⁎
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Industry effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3717 3717 3717 3717 3717 3717 3717
Firms 444 444 444 444 444 444 444
This table presents regression results of the impact of firm- and country-level variables on debt maturity in the MENA region. See Table 1 for variables' definitions. The regressions are
estimated using the random effects panel method. All models are estimated with a switched on clustering option and, thus, the computed standard errors are robust to interdependence
in cross-country error terms. Numbers in parentheses indicate p- values.
⁎ Significance at 10% level.
⁎⁎ Significance at the 5% level.
⁎⁎⁎ Significance at the 1% level.
20 We also estimate models that include SMD, but do not report them for the sake of
space since SMD appears insignificant in all thesemodels nomatterwhat estimation tech-
nique is used.
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cial intermediaries' development variables, we include CR as a measure
of creditor rights' protection. Consistent with the view that lenders are
more willing to extend long-term credit in environments of stronger
creditor rights, we find a positive and significant association at the 5%
level between CR andDMAT. The economicmagnitude of the coefficient
estimate on CR suggests a substantial impact of the extent to which
creditors are protected against borrower expropriation on firms' access
to long-term debt. Specifically, a 1-unit increase in the CR index in-
creases the proportion of long-term debt in MENA firms' total debt by
53.2%. This finding highlights the importance of reforming creditor
and bankruptcy regimes to increase creditors' protection and thereby
enhance their incentives to extend long-term debt to firms. Specifically,
firms located in Oman and Tunisia, where CR equals zero, would gain
access tomuchmore long-term debt if creditor rights are strengthened.
This finding together with the finding that financial development
(FIND) is positively associated with DMAT suggests that banks play an
important role in firms' access to long-term debt. In other words, in
the presence of well-developed banks that are granted sufficient credi-
tor rights, firms can raise more long-term debt. However, in environ-
ments of insufficient financial development and where creditor rights
are weak, banks are reluctant to extend long-term credit to firms.In sum, our results suggest that the quality of institutions is an im-
portant determinant of corporate debt maturity in the MENA region
and that our documented limited use of long-term debt in the region
is at least partly due to weak institutional environments that prevail in
most countries. As financial development, public governance, and cred-
itors' legal protection improve firms in the region tend to use more
long-term debt. MENA countries challenged with high unemployment
rates and low private investment rates would hence gain in terms of
their firms' access to long-term debt – and thereby more long-term in-
vestment and employment – by implementing reforms that enhance
public governance, strengthen the financial system, and improve credi-
tors' legal protection.
4.3. Robustness analyses
4.3.1. Alternative estimation methods
In Table 8, we analyzewhether our results reported in Table 7 contin-
ue to hold when we use alternative regression techniques.20 In models
Table 8
Alternative estimation methods.
OLS Firm fixed effects 2SLS
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
LEV 0.342⁎⁎⁎ 0.339⁎⁎⁎ 0.344⁎⁎⁎ 0.333⁎⁎⁎ 0.471⁎⁎⁎ 0.470⁎⁎⁎ 0.469⁎⁎⁎ 0.471⁎⁎⁎ 0.379⁎⁎⁎ 0.378⁎⁎⁎ 0.379⁎⁎⁎ 0.375⁎⁎⁎
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
SIZE 0.867⁎⁎ 0.937⁎⁎ 0.703⁎ 1.182⁎⁎⁎ 0.657⁎ 0.569 0.594⁎ 0.586⁎ 0.807⁎ 0.764 0.705 0.877⁎
(0.023) (0.015) (0.063) (0.007) (0.068) (0.151) (0.093) (0.073) (0.097) (0.115) (0.143) (0.099)
GROWTH −0.021⁎⁎ −0.021⁎⁎⁎ −0.021⁎⁎ −0.020⁎⁎ −0.035⁎⁎ −0.036⁎⁎ −0.034⁎⁎ −0.035⁎⁎ −0.025⁎ −0.025⁎ −0.025⁎ −0.025⁎
(0.035) (0.007) (0.032) (0.034) (0.024) (0.021) (0.027) (0.022) (0.057) (0.060) (0.063) (0.060)
PPE 0.115⁎⁎⁎ 0.115⁎⁎⁎ 0.118⁎⁎⁎ 0.110⁎⁎⁎ 0.113⁎⁎⁎ 0.114⁎⁎⁎ 0.113⁎⁎⁎ 0.114⁎⁎⁎ 0.117⁎⁎⁎ 0.116⁎⁎⁎ 0.118⁎⁎⁎ 0.115⁎⁎⁎
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
AMAT 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.684) (0.510) (0.620) (0.653) (0.966) (0.923) (0.856) (0.926) (0.811) (0.799) (0.714) (0.778)
Z-SCORE 0.688⁎⁎⁎ 0.638⁎⁎⁎ 0.634⁎⁎⁎ 0.539⁎⁎⁎ 0.445⁎⁎⁎ 0.401⁎⁎⁎ 0.327⁎⁎⁎ 0.376⁎⁎⁎ 0.708 0.751⁎ 0.718 0.795⁎
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.112) (0.091) (0.105) (0.077)
ROA −0.196⁎⁎⁎ −0.194⁎⁎⁎ −0.199⁎⁎⁎ −0.187⁎⁎⁎ 0.170⁎⁎⁎ 0.161⁎⁎⁎ 0.158⁎⁎⁎ 0.159⁎⁎⁎ 0.128⁎⁎ 0.130⁎⁎ 0.134⁎⁎ 0.129⁎⁎
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.046) (0.042) (0.036) (0.043)
ETR 0.856⁎⁎ 0.863⁎⁎⁎ 0.846⁎⁎ 0.879 0.741⁎⁎⁎ 0.739⁎⁎⁎ 0.733⁎⁎⁎ 0.738⁎⁎⁎ 0.764⁎⁎⁎ 0.766⁎⁎⁎ 0.756⁎⁎⁎ 0.768⁎⁎⁎
(0.021) (0.008) (0.021) (0.229) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
GDPG 0.247⁎ 0.223 0.256⁎ 0.288⁎ 6.734 0.238 0.978 0.978 1.458 1.403 1.705 1.227
(0.063) (0.093) (0.058) (0.088) (0.341) (0.971) (0.880) (0.990) (0.816) (0.462) (0.776) (0.379)
INF −0.777 −0.785 −0.505 −0.522 −0.920⁎⁎ −0.854⁎⁎ −0.733⁎⁎ −0.752⁎⁎ −0.942⁎ −0.744⁎ −0.602 −0.738⁎⁎
(0.395) (0.253) (0.754) (0.285) (0.024) (0.050) (0.032) (0.026) (0.083) (0.054) (0.175) (0.048)
FIND 0.017⁎⁎⁎ 0.010⁎⁎ 0.018⁎⁎⁎ 0.026⁎⁎⁎ 0.053⁎⁎⁎ 0.055⁎⁎⁎ 0.055⁎⁎⁎ 0.059⁎⁎⁎ 0.033⁎⁎⁎ 0.037⁎⁎⁎ 0.033⁎⁎⁎ 0.039⁎⁎⁎
(0.008) (0.040) (0.006) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
RL 0.171⁎⁎⁎ 0.167⁎⁎ 0.304
(0.000) (0.025) (0.283)
RE 0.430⁎⁎⁎ 0.787⁎⁎ 0.469⁎⁎
(0.000) (0.023) (0.023)
CORR −0.295⁎⁎⁎ −0.846⁎⁎ −0.795⁎⁎⁎
(0.000) (0.021) (0.000)
CR 0.762⁎⁎⁎ 0.501⁎⁎ 0.339⁎⁎
(0.002) (0.031) (0.043)
Intercept −0.758⁎⁎⁎ −0.633⁎⁎⁎ −0.506⁎⁎⁎ −0.586⁎⁎⁎ −0.831⁎ −0.512⁎⁎ −0.529⁎⁎ −0.550⁎⁎ −0.405⁎⁎⁎ −0.434⁎⁎⁎ −0.543⁎⁎⁎ −0.462⁎⁎⁎
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.061) (0.036) (0.017) (0.021) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Adjusted R2 0.532 0.531 0.532 0.463 0.432 0.441 0.435 0.436 0.514 0.514 0.517 0.516
Industry effect Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3717 3717 3717 3717 3717 3717 3717 3717 3717 3717 3717 426
Firms 444 444 444 444 444 444 444 444 444 444 444 117
IV-GMM Random effects Tobit model
Variable (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20)
LEV 0.307⁎⁎⁎ 0.307⁎⁎⁎ 0.305⁎⁎⁎ 0.304⁎⁎⁎ 0.480⁎⁎⁎ 0.480⁎⁎⁎ 0.476⁎⁎⁎ 0.482⁎⁎⁎
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
SIZE 0.746⁎⁎⁎ 0.739⁎⁎⁎ 0.660⁎⁎⁎ 0.678⁎⁎⁎ 0.993⁎⁎⁎ 0.955⁎⁎⁎ 0.852⁎⁎⁎ 0.832⁎⁎⁎
(0.003) (0.003) (0.007) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
GROWTH −0.010⁎ −0.008 −0.011 −0.007 −0.020 −0.020 −0.020 −0.019
(0.059) (0.648) (0.532) (0.695) (0.230) (0.225) (0.224) (0.238)
PPE 0.074⁎⁎⁎ 0.070⁎⁎⁎ 0.071⁎⁎⁎ 0.068⁎⁎⁎ 0.206⁎⁎⁎ 0.204⁎⁎⁎ 0.204⁎⁎⁎ 0.207⁎⁎⁎
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
AMAT 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.416) (0.667) (0.617) (0.607) (0.586) (0.561) (0.562) (0.489)
Z-SCORE 0.555⁎⁎⁎ 0.616⁎⁎⁎ 0.593⁎⁎⁎ 0.554⁎⁎⁎ 0.236⁎ 0.290⁎ 0.256⁎ 0.231⁎
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.073) (0.067) (0.082) (0.064)
ROA −0.168⁎⁎⁎ −0.174⁎⁎⁎ −0.173⁎⁎⁎ −0.160⁎⁎⁎ −0.025⁎ −0.029⁎ −0.026⁎ −0.025⁎
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.063) (0.058) (0.062) (0.063)
ETR 0.331⁎⁎⁎ 0.332⁎⁎⁎ 0.327⁎⁎⁎ 0.321⁎⁎⁎ 0.792⁎⁎⁎ 0.793⁎⁎⁎ 0.794⁎⁎⁎ 0.780⁎⁎⁎
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
GDPG 0.188⁎ 0.170⁎ 0.181⁎ 0.185⁎ 0.404 0.034 0.036 0.046
(0.052) (0.061) (0.084) (0.073) (0.315) (0.474) (0.260) (0.594)
INF −0.406 −0.785 −0.547 −0.483 −0.455 −0.424 −0.526 −0.594
(0.911) (0.831) (0.883) (0.704) (0.900) (0.734) (0.880) (0.826)
FIND 0.015⁎⁎⁎ 0.013⁎⁎⁎ 0.011⁎⁎⁎ 0.010⁎⁎⁎ 0.092⁎⁎⁎ 0.079⁎⁎⁎ 0.086⁎⁎⁎ 0.084⁎⁎⁎









Intercept −0.800⁎⁎⁎ −0.543⁎⁎⁎ −0.549⁎⁎⁎ −0.628⁎⁎⁎ −2.895⁎⁎⁎ −2.558⁎⁎⁎ −2.429⁎⁎⁎ −2.438⁎⁎⁎
(0.004) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Adjusted R2 0.583 0.587 0.597 0.563 – – – –
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21 For the sake of robustness check we also run the same model specifications as in
Table 7 using a random effects logit regression model. In this model, we code the de-
pendent variable as one if the firm has a high level of long term debt (higher than the
3rd quartile) and zero for firms with low levels of long term debt (1st quartile and be-
low) in a given year. This alternative method generates results (not reported for the
sake of space, but available upon request) similar to those reported in Table 7. There-
fore, our results do not seem to be affected by extreme values of long term debt.
Table 8 (continued)
IV-GMM Random effects Tobit model



























– – – –
Industry effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3717 3717 3717 3717 3717 3717 3717 3717
Firms 444 444 444 444 444 444 444 444
This table presents additional regression results of the impact of firm- and country-level variables on debtmaturity using alternative estimation techniques. The dependent variable DMAT
is calculated as the ratio of long-term debt (maturingmore than 1 year) to total debt. See Table 1 for the definition of the variables. All models are estimatedwith a switched on clustering
option and thus, the computed standard errors are robust to interdependence in cross-country error terms. Sargan is a test statistics for the validity of the instruments used, and rejection
implies that the instruments are not valid. AR(1) and AR(2) are tests statistics for first and second order autocorrelations, respectively. Numbers in parentheses indicate p- values.
⁎ Significance at 10% level.
⁎⁎ Significance at the 5% level.
⁎⁎⁎ Significance at the 1% level.
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nique, as in Barclay and Smith (1995) and Guedes and Oplar (1996). All
specifications include industry dummies and time dummies, which con-
trol for time-invariant industry-specific characteristics, and for a com-
mon time effects across firms. Consistent with what is reported in
Table 7, we continue to find that LEV, SIZE, PPE, and Z-SCORE are posi-
tively and significantly associated with DMAT. Additionally, we report
negative and significant relations between GROWTH and ROA and our
dependent variable, DMAT. The result on GROWTH is consistent with
Myers' underinvestment theory whereas the result on ROA – a proxy
for firm quality – is in linewith Flannery's signaling theory of debtmatu-
rity. As in Table 7, we report a positive and significant association be-
tween FIND, RE, CR, and DMAT. RL, which appeared positive but
insignificant in Table 7, loads positive and significant in column (1).
CORR continues to be inversely related to DMAT. Overall, the use of ordi-
nary least squares reinforces our previous findings.
In columns (5)–(8), we present results based on the fixed effects
method. This estimation technique of controls for unobserved firm het-
erogeneity (individual differences). In all the regressions, we include
year dummies to account for different time periods that might effect
on the fraction of long-term debt in a firm's debt capital. As the fixed ef-
fects are already controlling for all unobserved firm variables, including
industry, we drop industry dummies from the regression equation to
avoid collinearity. Our findings support our earlier statement that im-
proving the institutional environment in theMENA countrieswould en-
hance firms' access to long-termdebt. Firm-level variables also continue
to be associated with DMAT as reported in Table 7. We also notice that
among the macroeconomic factors, INF, which appears insignificant
across all models reported in Table 7, loads consistently negative and
significant at least at the 5% level in Table 8. This result is consistent
with argument that higher inflation rates reduce creditors' willingness
to extend long-term credit due to concerns of increased loss of value
of loaned capital in inflationary environments (e.g., Demirgüç-Kunt &
Maksimovic, 1999). We conclude that our results are robust to the use
of firm fixed effects rather than random effects.
Following Johnson (2003), in models (9)–(12), we account for the
potential simultaneous determination of debt maturity and financial
leverage and estimate a simultaneous system of equations using the
two-stage least squares technique (2SLS). In the leverage regression
equation, we use the same explanatory variables as in the DMAT
model, except that we add a lagged leverage variable to identify the le-
veragemodel. The unreported results of the leverage regression indicate
that firm leverage is generally significantly associated with the explan-
atory variables, in linewith prior research on the determinants of finan-
cial leverage. As regards the DMAT equation which is the subject of ourfocus, we find that the use of the 2SLS technique generates results that
are generally consistentwith those reported in Table 7 andwith our ex-
pectations. In particular, our institutional variables continue to affect
debt maturity in virtually the same way as what is reported in Table 7.
We interpret this as evidence that our earlier results are not driven by
the potential endogeneity of leverage.
To further verify that our earlier results are not driven by
endogeneity, we also estimate our DMATmodels using the Generalized
Method of Moments estimator (IV-GMM). This estimator treats the ex-
planatory variables as endogenous, with the exception of dummies. It is
also more efficient than 2SLS because it accounts for heteroskedasticity
(Hall, 2005) and does not require distributional assumptions on the
error terms. As columns (13)–(16) of Table 8 show, the coefficient esti-
mates of our explanatory variables in all specifications are generally
consistent with those reported in Table 7 and very similar to what we
obtain using the 2SLS technique. The IV-GMM estimations, therefore,
reinforce our conclusions and confirm that our earlier results are not
driven by endogeneity.
Because our dependent variable DMAT is truncated between0 and 1,
we further check the robustness of our results using a random effects
Tobit regression model. Our findings, reported in columns (17)–(20)
of Table 8 are consistent with our main results reported in Table 7; we
find that all our institutional variables continue to affect debt maturity
in the same way reported earlier. Our results are thus robust to the
use of various estimation methods.21
4.3.2. Alternative measure of debt maturity
In Table 9, we analyze whether our evidence of the firm- and
country-level determinants of debt maturity in theMENA region is sen-
sitive to the measure of debt maturity. After El Ghoul et al. (2014), we
calculate DMAT2 as the ratio of total liabilities minus current liabilities
to total liabilities and use it as our dependent variable in the debt matu-
rity model. Models (1)–(5) of Table 9 replicate, respectively, models
(3)–(7) of Table 7 using DMAT2 as the dependent variable instead of
DMAT. As regards firm-level factors, our five models reinforce our find-
ings reported in both Tables 6 and 7 that firms' use of long-term debt in-
creases with leverage, size, tangible assets, lower default risk, and
greater tax rates. Consistent with results reported in Table 7, apart
Table 9
Alternative debt maturity measure.
Long-term liabilities to total liabilities (DMAT2)
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
LEV 0.209⁎⁎⁎ 0.210⁎⁎⁎ 0.210⁎⁎⁎ 0.197⁎⁎⁎
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
SIZE 0.917⁎⁎⁎ 0.921⁎⁎⁎ 0.913⁎⁎⁎ 0.981⁎⁎⁎
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
GROWTH 0.019 0.018 0.020 0.019
(0.408) (0.438) (0.393) (0.406)
PPE 0.281⁎⁎⁎ 0.280⁎⁎⁎ 0.284⁎⁎⁎ 0.278⁎⁎⁎
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
AMAT 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.972) (0.985) (0.897) (0.915)
Z-SCORE 0.853⁎⁎⁎ 0.899⁎⁎ 0.909⁎⁎ 0.571⁎⁎
(0.026) (0.023) (0.023) (0.045)
ROA −0.072 −0.073 −0.071 −0.068
(0.209) (0.202) (0.216) (0.231)
ETR 0.212⁎ 0.205⁎ 0.206⁎ 0.211⁎⁎
(0.079) (0.088) (0.087) (0.080)
GDPG 0.065 0.672 0.051 0.087
(0.829) (0.086) (0.946) (0.662)
INF −0.491⁎⁎⁎ −0.421⁎⁎⁎ −0.455⁎⁎ −0.427⁎⁎⁎
(0.006) (0.006) (0.031) (0.009)
FIND 0.075⁎⁎⁎ 0.044⁎⁎ 0.065⁎⁎⁎ 0.081⁎⁎⁎









Intercept −0.332⁎⁎⁎ −0.352⁎⁎⁎ −0.368⁎⁎⁎ −0.329⁎⁎⁎
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Adjusted R2 0.460 0.464 0.463 0.463
Wald test 474.75⁎⁎⁎ 489.51⁎⁎⁎ 486.57⁎⁎⁎ 481.56⁎⁎⁎
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Industry effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3717 3717 3717 3717
Firms 444 444 444 444
This table presents regression results of the impact of firm- and country-level variables on
debt maturity measured by Long-term liabilities to total liabilities (DMAT2). See Table 1
for the definition of the variables. The regressions are estimated using the random effects
panelmethod. Allmodels are estimatedwith a switched on clustering option and thus, the
computed standard errors are robust to interdependence in cross-country error terms.
Numbers in parentheses indicate p- values.
⁎ Significance at 10% level.
⁎⁎ Significance at the 5% level.
⁎⁎⁎ Significance at the 1% level.
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debt maturity; greater financial intermediation development, stronger
rule of law, better regulatory effectiveness, and stronger protection of
creditors, and more corruption enhance firms' access to long-term
debt. In sum, our results reported earlier in the main analysis
(Table 7) are robust to the use of another measure of debt maturity
(DMAT2).
5. Conclusions
According to the most recent World Bank Enterprise Surveys data-
base, 40% of MENA firms identify access to finance as a major constraint
in doing business. In parallel with this, recent research shows that access
to finance depends, among others, on the institutional environment in
which the firm is operating (e.g., Booth, Aivazian, Demirguc-Kunt, &
Maksomovic, 2001; Giannetti, 2003; Antoniou et al., 2008; De Jong,
Kabir, & Nguyen, 2008; Gungoraydinoglu & Oztekin, 2011; Fan et al.,
2012; Oztekin & Flannery, 2012). Specifically, prior research suggests
that better institutional environments facilitate firms' access to debt cap-
ital in general, and long-term debt in particular. Yet, this research doesnot cover the MENA region. Consequently, very little, if any, is known
on the financial structures of firms located in this region and onwhether
they are determined by the samefirmand institutional factors as those of
firms located in other parts of the world.
In this paper, we fill part of this gap in the literature by investigating
the state of corporate debtmaturity and its firm and institutional deter-
minants in theMENA. Using a sample of 444 listed firms over the 2003–
2011 period, or 3717 firm-year observations, we find a very limited use
of long-termdebt byMENAfirms; long-termdebt represents only 2.45%
of the typicalMENAfirm's total debt, which ismuch less thanwhat is re-
ported in prior literature on other parts of theworld. In stepwith extant
literature, we further find that leverage,firm size, asset tangibility are all
positively associatedwith debtmaturity. Default risk is inversely related
to debtmaturity, consistentwith thefindings of prior literature on other
parts of the world. In addition, we find that better quality institutions
lead to the use of more long-term debt by firms. Specifically, stronger
rule of law, better regulatory effectiveness, better legal protection of
creditor, and more developed financial intermediaries are associated
with greater use of long-term borrowing by MENA firms.
Our analysis has several policy implications for the MENA countries.
First, MENA countries should put the goal of enhancing their firms' ac-
cess to external finance, especially long-term debt on top of their
agendas. This is much needed as the alleviation of the problem of ram-
pant unemployment faced by most MENA countries requires an in-
crease in private investment, which is, in turn, conditional on firms'
access to long-term capital. Second, MENA countries known to be lag-
ging behind in terms of the quality of their public governance would
gain substantially in terms' of their firms' access to long-term capital
by introducing reforms that strengthen the rule of law and enhance reg-
ulatory quality. Third, reforming insolvency regimes and strengthening
creditor rights would boost lenders' willingness to extend long-term
credit. Finally, since the quasi totality of corporate loans in the MENA
is raised from the banking system, MENA countries are encouraged to
fasten the pace of bank reforms that would enhance the availability of
credit, especially long-term credit.References
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